HOT PEOPLE, HOT PLACES:
## TWO FRAMEWORKS FOR MODERN STRATEGIC CRIME CONTROL

The National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives
2016 William R. Bracey Symposium
Hollywood, FL
February 12, 2015

David M. Kennedy

Violence and community chaos is a
national scandal

Violent crime is very high in places, even in "safe" cities

Concentrated in poor minority, especially black, neighborhoods

Black men are ~6% of the population, ~50% of the homicide dead

National homicide rate now ~4:100,000: but in places like Rochester's "Crescent," young black men are killed at a rate of 520 in 100,000

- 65 times national average
- 1 in 200 young black men killed every year

Mass Shootings as a percentage of total US homicides 1982-2012

99.9%

■ Other Homicides
■ Mass Shooting Homicides

Sources: Motherjones.org
Thinkprogress.org
Dailykenn.com

Main Lessons

- Most serious crime is driven by a very small number of hot groups and hot people, and a very small number of hot places

- "Dangerous neighborhoods" aren't really dangerous: they're pretty ordinary places with a small number of very high-risk people and places in them

- When we flood those neighborhoods with enforcement, we touch residents unnecessarily, damage them and their families with the unintended consequences of arrest, prosecution, and incarceration, harm the fabric of their communities, and undercut our legitimacy

- High-risk people and places can be identified and dealt with in very careful ways that are more effective and do not do unintended harm

HOT PEOPLE AND GROUPS

Connection between violence & groups

The most important finding here is simple: there is a profound and so far invariant connection between serious violence, and highly active criminal groups.

0.5%

Representation in population

50-75%

Representation in homicides

CIRV network analysis of sets

Source: University of Cincinnati Policing Institute

"Beef"   Alliance   Volatile

Baltimore 2013

Total population: 40,900

Group Member Involved (GMI):
Between 528 -538

Groups: 31

Source: Western District-Baltimore Group Violence Intervention Problem Analysis

Chattanooga 2013

**Total population:** 171,279

Group Member Involved (GMI): between 653 and 863

Groups: 39

Legend:
- Non-GMI
- GMI

Population: 0.5%
Homicides: 58%

Source: Chattanooga Group Violence Intervention Problem Analysis

Criminal histories of Newark Murder Victims and Suspects, 2012-2013

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Strategic Intervention

Direct, sustained engagement with core offenders by a partnership standing and acting together:

- Community leaders
- Social service providers
- Law enforcement

Explicit focus on homicide and serious violence

Core elements:

- Moral engagement
- Offer of help
- Swift, certain, legitimate consequences

An approach, not a program

1 Heightened sense of consequences

Group accountability for gang and group violence
   By any legal means: "pulling levers"
   "Worst group/next group"
Personal notice of federal exposure
(Chicago PSN)
Formal notice of law enforcement intent
Special response, with prior explanation

2 Moral engagement with offenders

Offenders can and will choose, should be treated as responsible human beings

Challenge the street code

There's right, there's wrong: no gray area

Activates agency: offender is now in control

Treats offender with respect: procedural justice

Enhances law enforcement legitimacy

Mobilizes community partners

Community moral voice

Clear, direct community stand from respected local figures, parents, ministers, mothers, activists:

"We need you alive and out of prison."

"You're better than this."

"We hate the violence."

Offenders and ex-offenders:

"Who helped your mother last time you were locked up?"

"How long before one of your boys sleeps with your girlfriend?"

"Who thinks it's okay for little kids to get killed?"

Outreach workers are among the very best at all of this

3 Help as a moral and practical obligation

"We are here to keep you alive and out of prison."

"You have been targeted – to be saved."

Address trauma

Protect from enemies

Offer "big small stuff" – crucial real-time needs

Safe havens

New relationships and "sponsors"

New ideas to replace "street code"

Links to traditional social services – education, work, etc.

Street outreach an important way to do all this

Support & outreach

Perceptual differences

GVI model

- Deals with small population of active group members

- Success is keeping people alive and reducing violence

Traditional services

- Community-wide orientation

- Success is program completion, job placement & retention, recidivism, etc.

4 Direct communication with offenders

- Gang/group call-in: use probationers and parolees to reach groups on the street. Used to reach *groups*

- Parole/probation call-in: ID impact players, supervisees with records indicating gun/gang connections. Used to reach *individuals*

- Home/street visits – "custom notifications"

- Communicate with "influentials" by proxy

Core direct messages

- It has to stop. End of story. It's wrong, it hurts, you're better than this, you don't like it, we don't want to live like this any more
- Your community and loved ones need it to stop
- You are hugely important and valuable
- The ideas you are living by are wrong
- We will do everything we can to help you
- We will stop you if you make us
- Here are the legal risks you face
- None of us like how we have been living; we all want to change

Strategies so far to address

- Gang/group violence
    - "Ceasefire," "GVI"
- Individual gun/violent offenders
    - "Chicago PSN"
- Drug markets
    - "DMI"
- Robbery
- High-rate recidivists
- Probation supervision,
    - "HOPE," "swift, certain, fair"
- DUI
    - "24/7"
- Domestic violence

GVI Results

Published, peer-reviewed studies with control groups

63%

reduction in youth homicide
Boston (MA) Operation Ceasefire
(Braga, Kennedy, Waring, and Piehl, 2001)

42%

reduction in gun homicide
Stockton (CA) Operation Peacekeeper
(Braga, 2008)

37%

reduction in homicide
Chicago (IL) Project Safe Neighborhoods
(Papachristos, Meares, and Fagan, 2007)

44%

reduction in gun assaults
Lowell (MA) Project Safe Neighborhoods
(Braga, Pierce, McDevitt, Bond, and Cronin, 2008)

34%

reduction in homicide
Indianapolis (IN) Violence Reduction Partnership
(McGarrel, Chermak, Wilson, and Corsaro, 2006)

41%

reduction in gang member-involved homicide
Cincinnati (OH) Initiative to Reduce Violence
(Engel, et al, 2009)

Results, continued

Published, peer-reviewed studies with control groups

Boston Operation Ceasefire
- 36.4% reduction in gang-involved shootings among gangs treated with crackdowns
- 27.4% reduction in gang-involved shootings among gangs that received warnings (Braga 2014)

Chicago Group Violence Reduction Strategy
- 32% reduction in victimization among factions represented at call-ins
- 23% reduction in overall shooting behavior among factions represented at call-ins (Papachristos & Kirk 2015)

NOLA Group Violence Reduction Strategy
- 32% decrease in group member-involved homicides (Engel & Corsaro 2015)

Cincinnati CIRV
- 41.4% reduction in group member-involved homicides, with increasing impact over 3.5 years
- "Focused deterrence approaches can have stability over time if implemented properly and the organizational processes are institutionalized" (Engel, Tillyer, & Corsaro 2013)

Chicago PSN
- 37% reduction in neighborhood-level homicide (Papachristos, Meares, & Fagan 2007)
- 50% reduction in violent offending among notified parolee (Wallace, et al 2015)

HOT PLACES

Geographic concentration

- Small proportion of places responsible for overall city trends in crime

- Micro places—such as buildings, addresses, block faces, and street segments—have stable concentrations of crime over time

- Underlying dynamics of a place are key to explaining crime concentrations (Braga, 2008; Eck & Weisburd, 1995)

Geographic concentration

- Only 3% of addresses in Minneapolis produced 50% of all calls for service (Sherman, et al., 1989)

- 10% of places in the Bronx and Baltimore accounted for 32% of robberies, assaults, burglaries, etc. (Eck, et al., 2000)

- "Worst 10 percent of locations and times accounting for about 50 percent of all calls for service" over 3 years in Boston (Spelman, 1995)

Crime concentration in Seattle

(Weisburd, et al., 2004)

Seattle crime drop analysis

(Weisburd, et al., 2004)

Interventions

- Traditional "hot spots policing"—increasing police visibility and arrests—produces only modest effects on crime

- Problem-oriented interventions that attempt to alter the dynamics of place have more meaningful impact

   (Braga, et al., 2012)

- Seattle police/public problem-oriented partnerships

Results

Published, peer-reviewed studies of problem-oriented, place-based interventions

Jersey City Displacement and Diffusion Study (Weisburd et al. 2006)
- 45% reduction at targeted prostitution location
- 58% reduction at targeted drug crime location
- Significant diffusion of crime control benefits

Lowell Policing Crime and Disorder Hot Spots Project (Braga and Bond 2008)
- Robbery calls reduced by 41.8%; Nondomestic assault reduced by 34.2%
- 19.8% reduction in total calls for service