

# **Disrupting Open Air Drug Markets**

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# Presentation Outline

- Theoretical Framework and Brief Review of Pulling Levers Policing Strategies
- Extending the Pulling Levers Model to Disrupt Illicit Street Drug Markets
- Drug Market Intervention (DMI) Initial Process & Impact Evaluations
- Discussion
- Directions for Future Research

# Integrating Deterrence & Social Support

- Offenders with a long criminal history do not believe in the certainty of punishment—i.e., they have experience and evidence to the contrary (Horney and Marshall, 1992)
- A **general threat** of imprisonment will not have a long-term deterrent effect (Nagin, 1998)
- Thus, important to ‘make the threat a **credible one**’, specific to each offender
- It is also important to incorporate a social support component (Cullen, 1994) and to reduce potential defiance (Sherman, 1993)

# The “Pulling Levers” Strategy

- Pulling levers — **focused deterrence** taking advantage of vulnerabilities of chronic and violent offenders (Kennedy, 1997)
- Sought to reduce youth homicide/gun violence through a more tightly coupled CJ network
- Boston’s *Ceasefire* provided the operational foundation for this intellectual approach (Kennedy et al., 1996; Braga et al., 2001)
- Employed a problem-oriented policing approach to address the problem (Goldstein, 1990)
- Loss of anonymity among serious offenders

# Replicating Ceasefire

- Chicago, Illinois (Papachristos et al., 2007)
- Indianapolis, Indiana (McGarrell et al., 2006)
- Lowell, Massachusetts (Braga et al., 2008)
- Minneapolis, Minnesota (Kennedy & Braga, 1998)
- Stockton, California (Braga, 2008)
- Additional sites have replicated Ceasefire with promising results
- These programs led to the Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) initiative where initial impact results have also shown significant promise (McGarrell et al., in press)

# Street Drug Market Context

- Much of the early emphasis of pulling levers programs was on disrupting illegal gun markets, gun carrying, gang activity, and high-risk behavior associated with violence and gun crime
- Illicit gun markets and gang networks are *similar contextually* to open-air drug markets regarding:
- Communication structure among co-offenders
- High instances of offender 'replacement'
- Low expectation of CJ punishment (Boyum & Reuter, 2005)
- Chronic offenders vulnerable to CJ sanctions

# High Point DMI

- Officials in High Point, North Carolina, used this set of principles in an effort to disrupt street drug markets across the city
- Initial strategy was implemented in the West End Neighborhood in May 2004 where impact appeared promising (Frabutt et al., 2004)
- Replicated strategy in a) Daniel Brooks Community (April 2005), b) Southside area (June 2006) and c) East Central neighborhood (August 2007)—and the results were stable and consistent (Kennedy and Wong, 2009)

# Additional Strategies

- Theory behind the approach was solid, pulling levers as a problem-oriented policing strategy had shown promise in a variety of contexts (i.e., youth gun and gang violence & drug markets)
- Bureau of Justice Assistance provided support for additional cities interested in replicating and adopting this approach
- Some of the early sites were Hempstead, NY; Winston-Salem, Greensboro, and Raleigh, NC; Providence, RI; Rockford, IL; Nashville, TN; Milwaukee, WI (Kennedy and Wong, 2009)



# Evaluations Beyond High Point

- Detail the process and impact assessments of DMI in Rockford, IL & Nashville, TN
- Critique the strengths and limitations of our initial DMI evaluations
- Provide a framework and outline for future studies in this area and how prior research can be improved upon


# Implementation

- Following the flow model of the intervention strategy (see Kennedy and Wong, 2009: 7) we found that both Rockford and Nashville were consistent in adhering the DMI framework:
- **Identification Phase:** Identify an area (Weisburd et al., 2004) and individuals operating in the area through detailed investigations
- **Notification Phase:** Police/Community come together in the “Call In” (Kennedy, 1997)
- **Resource Delivery:** Community Support Phase

# Rockford Impact Results

- Used a mixed-methodology to examine crime trends in the “Delancey Heights” target area (pseudonym)
- Utilized offense (incident) trends relying on two years of ‘pre-intervention’ data and one year of ‘post-intervention’ data (Corsaro et al., in press)
- HGLM growth curve models showed statistically significant decline (-22.2%) in non-violent incidents after the DMI was implemented
- Interviews with 34 target area respondents showed substantive changes of perceptions of crime and neighborhood dynamics

# Rockford Impact Results




Adapted from Corsaro et al. (in press, p. 11)


# Nashville Methodology Outline

- a) Extensive pre-intervention trend data (4 years)
- b) Crime incidents including drug/narcotic and Type I serious offenses
- c) Calls for police service data (Warner and Pierce, 1993)
- d) An adjacent neighborhood area (to test for a displacement/diffusion of benefits effect)
- e) Overall city comparison to gauge general crime trends
- f) Interviews with 44 target-area residents


# Drug Incident Offense Trends



# UCR Part I Offense Trends



# UCR Part I Offense Trends





# Nashville Results (Cont'd)

- Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) time-series models on the logged crime rates (to better approximate a normal distribution) indicated that Abrupt/Permanent TF models best fit the data
- These indicated an immediate/abrupt decline in the outcome measures relative to lagged and pulse changes
- In-depth target area resident interviews found substantive perceptual changes regarding crime on the street, physical and social incivilities, and enhanced informal networks among neighbors (i.e., improved informal social control)

# Limitations & Discussion

- Results indicate that crime and calls for service had greatest declines in target areas, adjoining area in Nashville experienced a modest decline in same outcomes (diffusion of benefits)
- Lack of suitable 'comparison' sites have hindered ability to assess 'control site' changes and improve internal validity of intervention estimates
- We are in the process of re-evaluating High Point data using later implementation locations as 'post facto comparison sites'

# Next Steps

- In addition to a detailed High Point trend evaluation, research team is in the process of conducting process and impact studies in Lansing, MI; Peoria, IL; Middletown, OH; Ocala, FL; Seattle, WA
- Greater emphasis on target area resident 'reaction' to the program including measures of a) awareness, b) involvement, c) perceptions of changes regarding crime, disorder, informal social control, and procedural justice

**Questions/Comments?**